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The interplay of international court decisions and their domestic implications is
currently challenged in the Kulbhushan Jadhav Case (India v. Pakistan). In this
case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its verdict on 17 July, 2019.
It concerns a 49-year-old former Indian Naval Officer, who was sentenced to
death by a Pakistani Military Court on 11 April 2017, on charges of espionage
and terrorism. The ICJ ruled against the death sentence awarded to Jadhav and
stayed his execution. While this much-awaited decision emphasized on respecting
the international obligation of providing consular access and ensuring fair trial for
detainees, there is not much clarity with respect to Jadhav’s sentence, as Pakistan
continues to enjoy considerable amount of autonomy in determining its future
course.
The only dissenting opinion was that of ad-hoc judge, Tassaduq Hussain Jillani,
former chief justice of Pakistan, who disagreed with the rest on most matters,
agreeing only that the Court has jurisdiction to hear India’s plea. Judge Jillani was of
the opinion that Pakistan lawfully withheld consular access and had already followed
fair procedure in the military court.
Factual background and timeline of the case
In its submission to the ICJ, Pakistan claimed that Jadhav was arrested by their
authorities in Balochistan on 3rd March, 2016, on allegations of espionage and
terrorism. Pakistan alleged that Jadhav was tasked by the Indian Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW) to destabilize the restive province of Balochistan, an area with
an ongoing separatist movement.
In contrast, India claimed in its application that Jadhav was ‘kidnapped from Iran,
where he was carrying on business after retiring from the Indian Navy and was then
shown to have been arrested in Baluchistan’ (para. 13) on suspicion of espionage
and sabotage activities. India alleged that Jadhav was arrested on 3rd March 2016,
but that it was informed of his arrest only on 25th March 2016 and that Pakistan
failed to inform Jadhav rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR). According to India, Pakistani authorities refused to give India consular
access to Jadhav, despite repeated requests.
Jadhav was tried for espionage by the Pakistani Field General Court Martial
(FGCM). On 10 April 2017, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing
of Pakistan’s armed forces announced in a press release that Jadhav had been
sentenced to death by the FGCM on the charge of espionage. India thereafter
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approached the ICJ requesting provisional measures directing Pakistan to ensure
that Jadhav was not executed until the court decided the merits of India’s claim. On
18 May 2017, the ICJ ordered a stay on Jadhav’s execution.
Jurisdiction and Admissibility
India invoked the jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36(1) of the Statute of the ICJ
in conjunction with Article I of the Optional Protocol to the VCCR concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, to which both India and Pakistan are State
Parties. Pakistan did not object to the jurisdictional claims. However, Pakistan
objected the admissibility on three grounds. It contended that since India had (1)
abused of process of law, (2) abused its rights, and (3) approached the court with
unclean hands, its application must not be admitted.
The ICJ rejected all these arguments. Firstly, Parties are not mandated to exhaust
the resolution mechanisms available under Articles II and III of the Optional Protocol
(arbitration and conciliation) before approaching the ICJ. Secondly, Pakistan’s
allegations that India had acted in contravention of Security Council Resolution 1373
of 2001, amongst others, concerned the merits of the case and not the admissibility
claim per se. Thirdly, the Court stated that the clean hands doctrine on its own could
not make the claim inadmissible, especially when Pakistan failed to explain the link
between India’s violation which disabled it from fulfilling its international obligation to
provide consular access.
Merits and Remedies
Article 36(1)(b) of the VCCR makes it clear that the detaining State is required to
inform the detainee of his rights under the provision. It also imposes an obligation,
when read in conjunction with Article 36(1)(c), on such receiving State to inform the
consular post of the sending State about such detention. Pakistan maintained that
Jadhav was involved in activities of espionage and, thus, not entitled to benefits of
consular access.
The ICJ found that Pakistan had violated its international obligation under Article
36 of the VCCR. Pakistan had not only failed to inform Jadhav of his rights, but
also to inform India, without delay, about Jadhav’s arrest and detention. Despite
India’s repeated to effectuate communication, Pakistan had denied consular access
to Jadhav. The Court also denied Pakistan’s contention that the 2008 bilateral
agreement between the two nations restricted the rights guaranteed by Article 36 of
the VCCR. In fact, the ICJ emphasized that there was no intention to curtail rights of
detainees in the 2008 Agreement.
The ICJ stated that Pakistan is under an obligation to immediately stop the
internationally wrongful act of denying consular access, and to comply with the
VCCR. Further, the Court urged Pakistan to provide, by means of its own choosing,
effective review and reconsideration of Jadhav’s conviction and sentence.
Grey Areas: Pakistan’s autonomy in deciding Jadhav’s fate
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The remedies sought by India pertaining to the annulment of the decision of the
FGCM, and securing Jadhav’s release and ordering his return to India were rejected
by the ICJ. In this regard, the judgment is consistent with and further reinforces the
jurisprudence of the ICJ in its previous cases of LaGrand and Avena, wherein the
court showed willingness to intervene – but largely on procedural grounds. The Court
dealt only with violations of Pakistan’s international obligations but did not delve into
the correctness of the decision of the FGCM on merits.
This means that Jadhav is not ‘off the hook’. Only on the basis of Pakistan’s breach
of the VCCR, the charges of espionage and terrorist activities would not be erased.
Jadhav will have to undergo trial again in Pakistan. So long as Indian consular
officers would have access to Jadhav and be able to give him assistance, it could
very well be that a new court would arrive at the same verdict, if the process of
review and reconsideration is effective by Pakistan’s standards.
Pakistan, therefore, has an opportunity to conduct a sham trial to find Jadhav guilty
again. Since India could approach the ICJ for another scrutiny, Pakistan may not
be able to afford that. It is most likely, therefore, that Pakistan will conduct a trial
which is open to the public. Such a trial will have to be fairer than the closed military
court trial that Jadhav underwent previously. This could be good news for Jadhav
and India. Now that Jadhav would be given consular access, India can provide
assistance in documentation and evidence and better aid the investigation process.
India can further ensure that Pakistan gives effect to the due process of law in
deciding Jadhav’s case again.
Consular Access
Pakistan has announced that it will grant consular access to Jadhav in accordance
with Pakistani laws – but, India apprehends that the condition “according to Pakistan
laws” could limit consular access, contrary to the standard rule. Till today, India has
entered into consular conventions with only four countries, East Germany (1974),
Czechoslovakia (1974), China (1991), and Russia (1986). As there exists no such
agreement between India and Pakistan, there is no clarity as to what kind of access
Jadhav will be provided.
For now, the future seems uncertain as Pakistan has the power of choosing its own
means in deciding Jadhav’s case. Pakistan may choose to control the consular
access provided, by mandating the presence of a Pakistani agent during the
time of conversation. For instance, at a previous time, the presence of Pakistani
authorities was agreed upon during the meeting between Jadhav and his mother
and wife. In such a situation, the detainee may fear reprisal if the police knew of the
communication. He may want to communicate to a consul the fact that the police are
mistreating him but may not be able to. If privacy of communication is not assured,
the purpose of having such communication may be vitiated.
Concluding Remarks
There have been two instances in the past that the ICJ has finally decided on a
dispute arising out of Article 36 of the VCCR – LaGrand and Avena. The reception
- 3 -
of the ICJ judgements in domestic forums sets a dangerous precedent in trying to
determine the course of Jadhav’s case in the Pakistani domestic Court hereafter.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Medellín v. Texas found that the decision of the ICJ in
Avena was not directly enforceable as domestic law in state court. Since the ICJ
decision has direct binding force only between states, a detainee (as in this case)
cannot be considered a party to the ICJ judgement. The decision of the ICJ in India’s
favour does not assure Jadhav’s acquittal and release.
The ICJ does not have the power to act as a criminal appellate forum and decide
on the correctness of the judgement of the Pakistani Court – all it can do is urge
Pakistan to give effect to the principles of natural justice. Therefore, while we can
consider the judgement of the ICJ a diplomatic win for India, it is impossible to deny
the vast extent of autonomy Pakistan enjoys in the future of this case. If Pakistan
chooses to provide consular access, carry out trial and arrive at the same decision,
there is very little that India can do.
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